The Cold War, spanning from the end of World War II to the early 1990s, was marked by ideological, military, and political tensions between the Western bloc, led by the United States, and the Eastern bloc, spearheaded by the Soviet Union. This bipolar world order manifested in proxy wars, arms races, and an intricate web of espionage activities. Intelligence agencies like the CIA and the KGB or Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti in Russian), became essential players in this power struggle, expanding their influence far beyond traditional diplomatic channels. Intelligence became a weapon of strategic warfare, where coded messages, double agents, and black operations held as much power as conventional arms.

Israel, a young state established in 1948, found itself in the midst of this ideological confrontation. Despite its alignment with the United States and Western Europe, Israel engaged in limited, pragmatic relationships with actors in the Soviet sphere when it served its national interests. Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, emerged as one of the most sophisticated intelligence services globally, sometimes cooperating with or navigating around the KGB’s sphere of influence. These unusual interactions, often through third-party actors or covert diplomacy, show that espionage in the Cold War era was shaped more by strategic imperatives than ideological loyalties.

Cooperation Amid Rivalry

Though Mossad and the KGB represented ideologically opposed nations, certain geopolitical interests led to tactical cooperation. One example was Mossad’s involvement in securing Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. Romania, often acting as an intermediary, accepted Israeli payments to facilitate Jewish departures, with the tacit knowledge of Soviet authorities. These operations were strategically managed by the KGB due to their economic and diplomatic advantages. Another example is the indirect intelligence interplay during the 1967 Six-Day War. Although the USSR supported Arab nations, the KGB refrained from acting directly against Israeli operations despite having knowledge of Israeli military movements. Some scholars suggest that both Mossad and KGB officers deliberately avoided steps that might escalate the situation into direct superpower confrontation.

Backchannels and Shared Threats

Third-party intermediaries like East Germany’s Stasi and Poland’s SB often acted as channels for communication or intelligence flow between Mossad and the KGB. During the 1970s, backdoor negotiations took place in neutral cities like Vienna, where Israeli officials and Soviet intermediaries quietly exchanged information on Jewish refuseniks. Mossad’s strategic restraint in certain Soviet-aligned states indicated a form of unspoken coordination to avoid clashes.

Additionally, both Mossad and the KGB had shared concerns about non-state actors. Palestinian organizations like the PFLP and Black September posed operational risks. Although some of these groups received Soviet support, when they destabilized Soviet regions—particularly in Central Asia—the KGB took action. Mossad reportedly passed on intelligence, directly or via intermediaries, on extremist cells influencing Soviet Muslims, which the KGB utilized to maintain internal stability.

Beyond bilateral maneuvering, a notable element of Mossad–KGB interaction involved neutral countries that hosted covert dialogues and facilitated intelligence transactions. Austria, Finland, and Switzerland—countries that maintained political neutrality—served as unofficial meeting points for intelligence intermediaries. These states provided plausible deniability for both sides and minimized the risk of diplomatic fallout. In Vienna, Soviet Jewish activists and Israeli diplomats occasionally convened under the watch of both Mossad and KGB agents, revealing a tacit understanding of each agency’s interest in ensuring these meetings remained controlled rather than disrupted.

Another illustrative example involves East Germany’s Ministry for State Security (Stasi), which maintained formal ties with the KGB while engaging in backchannel communications with Mossad. Declassified Stasi archives indicate an awareness of Israeli covert activity in Berlin, yet they rarely intervened—possibly due to broader Soviet-Israeli efforts to avoid direct conflict in intelligence operations on German soil. These neutral spaces and third-party conduits allowed both agencies to manage sensitive operations with limited friction, highlighting the subtle art of Cold War intelligence diplomacy.

Both sides had overlapping interests in war crimes and intelligence monitoring. Following World War II, both Mossad and the KGB sought to track down former Nazi operatives. The capture of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina by Mossad in 1960 occurred under the watchful eye of the Soviets. Though not formally involved, the KGB refrained from interfering with the operation, likely due to shared anti-fascist sentiments that aligned with Soviet propaganda. Figures like Shabtai Kalmanovich, a double agent, also bridged both agencies. While feeding the KGB with Israeli intelligence, he also worked within Israeli circles, embodying the blurred lines of Cold War espionage. His case reflects the extent to which individuals could serve both camps under the complex motivations of ideology, finance, and power.

Such cases illustrate that, while Mossad and KGB rarely collaborated overtly, they exploited overlapping interests and utilized intermediaries to manage risk, exchange information, and maintain a degree of strategic stability.

Post-Cold War Cooperation: After the Cold War, remnants of Mossad-KGB interactions continued through cooperation with the FSB, Russia’s successor to the KGB. Intelligence sharing on counterterrorism and organized crime, especially concerning Russian-Jewish immigrants, characterized the pragmatic shift in relations. The historical precedent of Cold War-era intelligence pragmatism helped pave the way for these ties.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the geopolitical landscape underwent significant transformations, prompting intelligence agencies to reassess and adapt their strategies. The KGB’s successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB), inherited not only the infrastructure but also the operational ethos of its predecessor. Concurrently, Israel’s Mossad faced the challenge of navigating a world where traditional Cold War dynamics had shifted, necessitating new alliances and operational paradigms.

One of the earliest instances of Mossad-FSB collaboration emerged in the realm of counterterrorism. The rise of Islamist extremism, particularly in the North Caucasus region, posed threats that transcended national boundaries. The tragic Beslan school siege in 2004, perpetrated by Chechen militants, underscored the urgency for international cooperation. In the aftermath, Israel extended support to Russia, emphasizing the shared imperative to combat terrorism. This gesture was not merely symbolic; it paved the way for intelligence-sharing initiatives aimed at thwarting similar threats.

The influx of Russian-speaking immigrants to Israel during the 1990s further intertwined the security interests of both nations. This demographic shift introduced complexities, including the potential for organized crime networks with transnational reach. Recognizing the mutual benefits, Mossad and the FSB engaged in joint operations targeting these criminal enterprises. Such collaborations were instrumental in dismantling syndicates involved in activities ranging from narcotics trafficking to cybercrime. However, the relationship was not devoid of challenges. Divergent national interests occasionally led to tensions, particularly concerning espionage activities. Instances of mutual surveillance and counterintelligence operations highlighted the underlying mistrust that persisted despite cooperative endeavors. Nevertheless, both agencies demonstrated a pragmatic approach, often compartmentalizing contentious issues to maintain collaboration in areas of shared concern.

Mossad-FSB interaction in 21^st century: The evolution of cyber threats in the 21^st century introduced another dimension to Mossad-FSB interactions. Recognizing the vulnerabilities posed by cyberattacks, both agencies acknowledged the necessity of information exchange to bolster their defensive capabilities. This mutual recognition has led to discreet collaborations aimed at countering shared cyber adversaries. One notable example is the intelligence exchange regarding ransomware groups that have targeted financial and governmental institutions in both nations. These joint efforts helped trace cybercriminal operations originating from transnational networks, particularly those using cryptocurrency obfuscation to evade law enforcement.

Additionally, both agencies have confronted non-state actors utilizing cyber tools for disruptive operations, including politically motivated attacks on election infrastructure and disinformation campaigns. While Russia and Israel often find themselves on opposing sides in geopolitical disputes, cooperation in the cyber domain has remained focused and compartmentalized, with operational discussions taking place in backchannel diplomatic engagements. Israel’s leadership in cyber defense, particularly through its Cyber Directorate and collaboration with Unit 8200, has offered valuable frameworks that Russia’s FSB has at times studied and adapted in the context of securing state infrastructure. Joint simulation exercises, reportedly hosted in neutral third-party states, have allowed operatives from both agencies to test cybersecurity readiness against malware deployment and AI-based attack simulations, strengthening both countries’ strategic resilience. Even though comprehensive details of such collaborations remain classified, open-source analyses suggest periodic dialogues aimed at addressing cyber threats emanating from non-state actors.

Conclusion

Despite clear ideological antagonism, Mossad and the KGB occasionally found mutual interest in shared goals—Jewish migration, managing regional conflict, counterterrorism, and even historical justice. The Cold War’s complexity extended to intelligence interactions that were shaped by necessity rather than ideology. In recent years, the geopolitical realignments, particularly Russia’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, have added layers of complexity to the Mossad-FSB dynamic. The foundational principle of pragmatic engagement, established in the post-Cold War era, continues to guide interactions between the two agencies. While cooperation continues in specific domains, broader strategic divergences, especially concerning Iran and Syria, have influenced the depth and scope of intelligence-sharing initiatives. This nuanced cooperation between rival agencies underscores the flexibility and realpolitik at the heart of Cold War intelligence.

[Image Credit: AI-generated illustration created with OpenAI tools (2025)]

Dr. Divya Malhotra is a researcher with Centre for National Security Studies, Bangalore. She is an economist by training and holds a PhD in Israel’s foreign policy from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.